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ABSTRACT 
  Constitutional law often splits society into two realms: public and 
private. A person’s constitutional rights and obligations depend on her 
classification into one of these realms. Almost all constitutional rights 
are only protected against encroachment by the state, and thus whether 
an action constitutes private or state action is incredibly significant. 
However, the body of law that governs this determination—the state 
action doctrine—is notoriously muddled. 
  The longstanding assumption is that political candidates and their 
campaigns are private actors, though the Court has on occasion, such 
as in the “white primary” cases, held that action by political parties 
constitutes state action. However, in recent years, the focus of 
electioneering has shifted away from political parties, and the 
democratic process has become far more candidate centric. At the same 
time, actions that might violate the Constitution if they were carried out 
by a state actor, such as the removal of protestors from campaign rallies 
and the rescission of press credentials for campaign events, have 
become widely publicized. In light of these developments, this Note 
argues that it is time to consider whether a candidate’s actions should 
now be considered state action for purposes of constitutional tort 
claims. By combining elements from the Supreme Court’s many 
formulations of the state action doctrine and invoking the logic behind 
the cases in which the Court found state action by political parties, this 
Note proposes a framework for assessing whether a candidate and her 
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campaign’s conduct on the campaign trail should be considered state 
action.  
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he hardest thing about any political campaign is how to win 
without proving that you are unworthy of winning.”  
Adlai Stevenson I1 
On March 1, 2016, from behind a podium with the American and 
Kentucky flags hanging in the background, then-presidential candidate 
Donald Trump repeatedly shouted, “Get ‘em outta here!”2 After 
observing signs held by protestors Kashiya Nwanguma, Molly Shah, 
and Henry Brousseau that depicted the candidate’s face on a pig’s 
body, Trump ordered that the three be removed from his campaign 
rally in Louisville, Kentucky.3 Members of the audience proceeded to 
assault the protestors, shoving and punching them until they exited the 
rally.4  
Though not always ending in violence, the practice of removing 
protestors from campaign events is not uncommon. Five months later, 
at a Trump rally in Portland, Maine, a group of protestors stood 
silently, pocket copies of the U.S. Constitution held above their heads.5 
Trump again paused his speech as campaign staffers escorted the 
protestors out of the building.6 This practice is also not unique to the 
Trump campaign. On January 2, 2016, in Amherst, Massachusetts, a 
man in a Trump shirt stood and shouted, “Shame on you, Bernie,” at 
 
 1. Richard Cavendish, Adlai Stevenson’s Second Run, HIST. TODAY (Aug. 8, 2006), 
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/adlai-stevenson%E2%80%99s-second-run [https://perma.cc/ 
AC9S-ZQV2]. 
 2. Lexington Herald Leader, Donald Trump Ousts Protesters in Louisville, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://youtu.be/vwMqf6Y7Md4 [https://web.archive.org/web/20201118001933if_/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwMqf6Y7Md4]. 
 3. Andrea Diaz, Trump Did Not Incite Violence Against Protesters at a 2016 Campaign 
Rally, Court Rules, CNN (Sept. 12, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/politics/
trump-wins-dismissal-lawsuit-kentucky-trnd [https://perma.cc/D6BX-6HCG]. 
 4. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 5. Jeremy Diamond, Protesters with Pocket Constitutions Removed from Trump Rally, 
CNN (Aug. 4, 2016, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/04/politics/donald-trump-protests-
constitution [https://perma.cc/B332-PUVE]. 
 6. Will Drabold, Protestors at Donald Trump Rally Hold Up Pocket Constitutions, TIME 
(Aug. 4, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://time.com/4439590/donald-trump-rally-pocket-constitutions 
[https://perma.cc/9FTG-79HR]. 
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the campaign rally of presidential candidate Bernie Sanders.7 Sanders 
supporters proceeded to “boo” the protestor as he was removed by 
campaign staff in response to Sanders’s call, “Here is a Trump 
supporter.”8  
The silencing of protestors ought to call to mind the First 
Amendment, which protects the right to speak freely and “attempt to 
persuade others to change their views,” even though “the speaker’s 
message may be offensive to his audience.”9 If this is true, one might 
ask: Why have the protestors from these incidents not taken to the 
courts to vindicate their First Amendment rights? Because the state 
action doctrine, as it is currently understood, stands in the way.10  
In Nwanguma v. Trump,11 the protestors removed from the 
Kentucky rally actually did take to the courts, but not with a First 
Amendment claim, likely presuming that the state action doctrine 
would foreclose such an argument.12 Instead, they sued Trump for 
injuries relating to the assault and battery committed by rally 
attendees, and they alleged that Trump had incited a riot.13 Responding 
to the complaint, Trump’s attorneys wrote in defense: 
 
 7. Dan Merica, Man Wearing Trump T-shirt Protests at Sanders Rally, CNN (Jan. 2, 
2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/02/politics/bernie-sanders-donald-trump-
protester [https://perma.cc/UY9Z-MLSW]. 
 8. Id. Unlike the first example, the Sanders rally did not result in violence against the 
protestors. 
 9. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10. When removing protestors, political candidates and their campaigns are often assumed 
to be private parties exercising their First Amendment right to control their message and remove 
those with opposing views from events. See Benjamin Good, What We Learn When People Are 
Kicked Out of Campaign Rallies, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2016), https://link.medium.com/
f5PqnrhmSab [https://perma.cc/UJE9-6Y5T] (“The First Amendment protects a campaign’s 
ability to control its political message. That’s why political candidates generally have the right to 
kick protesters out of campaign rallies.”); Lee Rowland & Rachel Goodman, Is It Okay To Kick 
People Out of Campaign Rallies? That Depends., ACLU (Mar. 15, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/it-okay-kick-people-out-campaign-rallies-depends [https://perma
.cc/4TDY-HSFJ] (“Campaigns can opt to exclude protesters from campaign rallies. The First 
Amendment doesn’t stop them—in fact, the First Amendment protects the campaign’s right to 
control its message.”). This Note, however, would flip this assumption on its head. 
 11. Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2017). 
 12. Complaint at 2, id. (No. 16-CV-247). 
 13. Id. at 14–18. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that because Trump’s statements were 
“calculated to incite violence,” they were not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 15. 
Although these protestors were able to file a tort claim for their physical and emotional injuries, 
in other cases involving a political candidate, such as the Sanders example, tort remedies are not 
available to vindicate the specific infringement of the protestors’ First Amendment right. 
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Of course, protestors have their own First Amendment right to 
express dissenting views, but they have no right to do so as part of the 
campaign rally of the political candidates they oppose. Indeed, 
forcing the “private organizers” of a political rally to accept everyone 
“who wish[es] to join in with some expressive demonstration of their 
own” would “violate[] the fundamental rule of protection under the 
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”14 
Relying on the assumption that Trump was a private actor 
throughout his presidential campaign, his attorneys invoked the First 
Amendment as a shield from the incitement claim. And in addition to 
shielding Trump in this instance, that assumption also serves to deter 
other similarly situated protestors from ever attempting to bring a First 
Amendment claim against the campaign. 
Constitutional law often splits society into two realms: public and 
private.15 Lawsuits, such as Nwanguma, are complicated by this 
distinction, as a party’s constitutional rights and obligations depend on 
its classification into one of these realms.16 In the political context, 
however, the distinction between public and private is not so cut and 
dried, especially as modern electioneering has shifted from being party 
centric to increasingly candidate centric.17 Nonetheless, courts must 
attempt to adjudicate claims by deciding whether an individual or 
organization is a state actor responsible for upholding the 
constitutional rights of others or a private actor entitled to 
constitutional rights of her own.18 State action analysis governs this 
difficult task.19 
Adding to this difficulty, the state action doctrine is historically 
inconsistent. If “[t]he public–private distinction . . . defines our legal 
bedrock, giving shape to legal systems while remaining mostly 
unseen, . . . [t]he state action doctrine represents the ragged, rocky 
 
 14. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, Nwanguma, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 
(No. 16-CV-247) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)). 
 15. John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
569, 570 (2005). 
 16. Id. (“Depending on which domain one is in makes all the difference in how one’s 
constitutional rights are adjudicated.”).  
 17. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Fee, supra note 15, at 575 (explaining that the Constitution only “enables and 
restrains government power”). 
 19. Id. at 573.  
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outcroppings of this bedrock.”20 Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has created a series of “tests” to guide this determination. From the 
public-function test to the entwinement approach,21 state action 
analysis remains a highly fact-intensive inquiry characterized by 
narrow holdings and seemingly contradictory outcomes. Considered a 
case study in “doctrinal confusion,”22 the state action doctrine 
continues to be the subject of many suggestions for improvement.23 
Unlike the work of other scholars in this area,24 this Note does not 
attempt a general revision of the state action doctrine. Rather, this 
Note presents the doctrine as it applies to political actors, specifically 
political candidates and their campaign organizations.25 Building off 
the “white primary” cases—in which the Court deemed political parties 
to be state actors when they excluded the plaintiffs from voting in the 
party’s primary election based solely on race—this Note discusses how 
the logic of those cases extends beyond the party to the candidate 
herself. Specifically, it argues that as the focus of modern politics has 
changed from parties to individual campaigns, the candidates 
themselves are an integral “part of the machinery for choosing 
[elected] officials”26 and thus can be considered state actors in certain 
circumstances.27  
 
 20. Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 286 (2013). 
 21. See infra Part II.C. 
 22. See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action 
Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REV. 575 passim (2016). Professor Christopher Schmidt defines “doctrinal 
confusion” as embodying three characteristics: vagueness, complexity, and incoherence. Id. at 
604. 
 23. See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 
(1985) (suggesting the elimination of the state action requirement entirely); Martha Minow, 
Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and 
the Internet: Directing Law To Serve Human Needs, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 145 (2017) 
(discussing the merits of seven proposed alternative approaches to the state action doctrine); 
Turner, supra note 20 (proposing a new two-step institutional approach to analyzing state action 
problems). 
 24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.  
 25. The phrases “political candidate,” “political campaign,” and “political candidates and 
their campaigns” are used interchangeably throughout this Note. 
 26. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)). 
 27. As there is no singular test for state action and these analyses are highly dependent on 
the facts of the situation, this Note does not argue that political candidates should always be 
considered state actors in every circumstance. Instead, it identifies several factors, based on the 
Supreme Court’s previous holdings and tests, that courts should consider when determining 
whether a political candidate’s conduct was state action. 
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the mechanics of 
constitutional tort claims and highlights how these claims require that 
the deprivation of constitutional rights occur “‘under color’ of law,” 
which is identical to state action analysis.28 Part II traces the evolution 
of the state action doctrine and provides an overview of the Court’s 
various approaches to identifying state action. Part III describes how 
the Court has applied the state action doctrine to political parties and 
how it has been more apt to find state action when the private actor has 
become an “integral part . . . of the elective process.”29 Finally, Part IV 
proposes several relevant factors courts should consider when applying 
the state action doctrine to political candidates. Specifically, it argues 
that the extensive regulation of campaigns, public funding for 
campaigns, other benefits received by candidates, and the status of a 
candidate as an incumbent or other state official may weigh in favor of 
a finding of state action. It also explores some of the possible 
implications of being classified as a state actor on the campaign trail.  
I.  VEHICLES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS 
Whether political candidates can be classified as state actors is 
irrelevant without avenues to hold candidates accountable for 
constitutional torts.30 This Part discusses the current vehicles available 
for individuals to bring such claims. 
Though the Constitution lays out a multitude of individual rights 
and limitations on government power, it notably lacks remedies to 
vindicate violations of most of these provisions.31 Historically, plaintiffs 
filed suits that evoked common law principles to redress constitutional 
violations.32 This resulted in a legal gap, however, as some 
constitutional violations were unenforceable because they lacked an 
 
 28. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 
383 U. S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)). 
 29. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion). 
 30. “Constitutional violations” and “constitutional torts” are used interchangeably 
throughout this Note. 
 31. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 
941 (2019) (“The Constitution says almost nothing about remedies for constitutional violations.”). 
 32. Id. at 943. Professor Fallon illustrates this practice using the example of Little v. Barreme, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), in which a plaintiff brought a trespass claim against a defendant who 
seized the plaintiff’s ship. Fallon, supra note 31, at 943. The defendant responded that he was 
acting upon orders from the president. Little, 6 U.S. at 178. The Court determined, however, that 
the orders were unlawful and thus the defendant’s compliance with those instructions was no 
defense. Id. at 179. Therefore, the defendant was held liable. Id. 
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adequate common law analog.33 For example, “the right to equal 
treatment, the right to vote, [and] the right to procedural due process, 
have no neat tort analogues.”34 Additionally, other rights, such as 
reproductive rights or free speech, “are uniquely rights against 
government action.”35 
To fill this gap, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,36 
which created a private cause of action to address the deprivation of 
constitutional rights. The law, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
provides that any person who “under color of [state law]” violates the 
constitutional rights of another “shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.”37 In Monroe v. Pape,38 the Court explained that the “three 
main aims” of the law were to “override certain kinds of state laws,” to 
“provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate,” and “to provide 
a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, 
was not available in practice.”39 Essentially, the statute’s primary effect 
is to provide access to the federal courts, even when state tort relief is 
available, as they are “the most appropriate place for redress of federal 
rights.”40 
Importantly, § 1983 cannot be used to sue states41 or territories42 
directly,43 as “Congress has no power under Article I of the 
Constitution to subject states to private damage actions, in either 
 
 33. See Fallon, supra note 31,  at 945 (“Some constitutional violations always fell beyond the 
reach of ordinary tort law for the plain reason that not all violations of constitutional norms were 
tortious.”). 
 34. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 14 (1980) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2018)). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 39. Id. at 173–74. For context, Congress passed the law as part of a federal effort to address 
Ku Klux Klan activities in states that had “made no successful effort to bring the guilty to 
punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent. The State, from lack of 
power or inclination, practically denied the equal protection of the law to these persons.” Id. at 
175 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871) (statement of Rep. John Beatty)). 
 40. Whitman, supra note 34, at 22–23.  
 41. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
 42. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 191–92 (1990). 
 43. However, municipalities and other local government units are considered “persons” and 
thus can be sued under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
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federal or state courts, for violating federal statutes.”44 Thus, § 1983 
claims must be brought against individual state officers in their 
personal capacities.45 The state, however, often ends up indirectly 
liable through indemnification contracts or monetary reimbursement 
policies for judgments against state officers.46 
Additionally, § 1983 only applies to acts committed under color of 
state law; it does not apply to federal actors.47 That said, federal actors 
can still be held liable for constitutional violations in two ways. First, 
federal courts may invoke their broad equitable powers to remedy the 
violation.48 Second, for some specific constitutional violations, a 
plaintiff may seek damages by filing a Bivens49 claim against the federal 
officer.50 However, the Court has greatly limited the availability of 
Bivens claims in recent years.51  
 
 44. Nick Daum, Comment, Section 1983, Statutes, and Sovereign Immunity, 112 YALE L.J. 
353, 353–54 (2002) (referring to the Court’s holdings in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)). 
 45. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991). These suits are based on a “legal fiction” 
where “the state official who acts in violation of the federal Constitution is ‘stripped of his official 
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual 
conduct.’” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting MSA Realty 
Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 1993)).  
 46. Daum, supra note 44, at 355. 
 47. The exclusion of federal actors was by design. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person 
who, under color of any . . . [law] of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia . . . .”).  
 48. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right 
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”). 
 49. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 50. A Bivens claim is a judicially created private right of action for damages against federal 
actors for certain constitutional violations. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020) 
(discussing the judicial history of Bivens claims); Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role 
of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 
719–20 (2012). In Bivens, plaintiff Warren Bivens alleged that federal agents conducted an 
unlawful search of his home, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. 403 U.S. at 389–90. In 
upholding Bivens’s right to sue, the Court explained that “[a]n agent acting—albeit 
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm 
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” Id. at 392. By concluding 
that Bivens had “state[d] a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment” against the federal 
officials, id. at 397, the Court “effectively held that federal law enables individuals to sue federal 
officers for constitutional violations.” James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (2009).  
 51. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“Given the notable change in the 
Court’s approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that 
expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009))). 
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Invoking the Constitution “as a sword”52 in a § 1983 or Bivens 
claim requires proof of two basic elements.53 First, plaintiffs must 
“show that they have been deprived of a right ‘secured by the 
Constitution and the laws’ of the United States.”54 Second, they must 
show that the defendant “deprived them of this right [while] acting 
‘under color of [law].’”55 Applying this test to strictly private parties 
illustrates its operation. “[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are 
protected only against infringement by governments.”56 Even so, a 
private person may still deprive another of those rights by her actions. 
Therefore, to subject a private person to liability for a constitutional 
violation, a plaintiff must show that the person acted “under color of 
law.”57 
“Under color of law” has come to be understood “as the same 
thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”58 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,59 the Court made this 
point explicit: “If the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes 
 
 52. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1532 (1972). 
 53. Though beyond the scope of this Note, the Court’s precedents recognize certain 
immunities that protect state actors against lawsuits; these further complicate constitutional tort 
claims. Absolute immunity is available to “the President, judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and 
officials performing ‘quasi-judicial’ functions, and legislators.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
520 (1985) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity is available to “government officials 
performing discretionary functions . . . as long as their actions could reasonably have been 
thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 638 (1987). A determination of qualified immunity requires a two-part analysis. First, 
the court must consider whether the alleged facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party 
asserting the injury . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Second, the Court 
must determine if “the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case.” 
Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Through this analysis, qualified immunity “provides ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). If this Note’s framework were adopted, future scholarship could 
explore the implications of the immunity doctrines on political candidates and their campaigns. 
 54. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 156. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) 
(“Whether they are identical or not, the state-action and the under-color-of-state-law 
requirements are obviously related.”). See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in greater detail. 
 59. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
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state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was 
also action under color of state law and will support a suit under 
§ 1983.”60 To summarize, a prerequisite for a successful constitutional 
tort claim under § 1983 or Bivens is that the defendant’s challenged 
action be classified as state action. What constitutes “state action,” 
however, is not as simple an inquiry as it may appear.  
II.  EVOLUTION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
A. “No State shall . . .” and the Origin of State Action 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides for equal protection and 
due process of law,61 and it secures those rights considered “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”62 But even though it may be expansive, 
the Fourteenth Amendment is limited in at least one important 
respect—by the language “No State shall.”63 As Justice Joseph Bradley 
elaborated in the Civil Rights Cases,64 “It is State action of a particular 
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is 
not the subject-matter of the amendment.”65  
The state action requirement serves a dual purpose. First, it 
protects individual freedoms against the abuse of government power,66 
thus allowing private citizens to “structure their private relations as 
they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional 
 
 60. Id. at 935. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 62. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Regardless of whether one subscribes to 
Justice Hugo Black’s theory of total incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the chief objects that the provisions of the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make 
the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states.”), or sides with the Court’s preferred approach of 
“selective incorporation,” see Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a 
Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979 
n.12 (1985) (providing an overview of the case law applying the Bill of Rights to the states), over 
the years the Court “has in fact ruled that most provisions of the Bill of Rights are so fundamental 
as to be applicable against the states.” Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination 
of a Supreme Court Justice: The Incorporation Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 
378 (2010). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 64. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 65. Id. at 11. 
 66. Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 561, 562–63 (2008).  
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law.”67 Second, this requirement protects state actors from liability for 
private “conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”68 In other 
words, courts cannot hold the state and its agents liable for private 
conduct that violates the Constitution unless the conduct is “fairly 
attributable to the State.”69 
The state action requirement, however, presents challenges in 
application. It inevitably requires drawing a line between private and 
state action. This is not always an easy task,70 particularly in the 
political context. As the next Section details, the Court has struggled 
with this distinction, creating a variety of approaches without providing 
one clear answer. 
B. The “Precedential Zoo” of State Action  
As noted above, the threshold inquiry for almost all constitutional 
claims is whether the allegedly violative conduct can be “fairly 
attributable to the State.”71 In Lugar, the Court articulated a two-part 
approach to this question: 
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the 
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second, 
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor.72 
It is this second part where most of the difficulty arises and in 
which the Court has been historically inconsistent.73 Scholars portray 
 
 67. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).  
 68. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 
 69. Id. at 937. 
 70. With increased privatization, it is harder to “identify where the government domain ends 
and the private domain begins for purposes of constitutional law.” Fee, supra note 15, at 572. 
 71. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The lone exception is claims brought under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which the Court has held to control conduct by both state and private actors. The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (“Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
legislation . . . necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery, may be direct 
and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or 
not . . . .”); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2008). 
 72. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
 73. See John Dorsett Niles, Lauren E. Tribble & Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Making Sense of State 
Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 886 (2011) (“Unfortunately, finding a meaningful 
distinction between ‘state action’ and ‘private action’ has proven difficult. The Court has 
considered the problem more than seventy times.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the state action doctrine as “a mess”74 and a “precedential zoo.”75 Even 
the Court itself has acknowledged the difficulties posed by the doctrine 
and its many, jumbled precedents.76 This inconsistency may be due to 
shifts in the ideological makeup of the Court over time or the subject 
matter of the regulation in question—for example, the Court is more 
apt to attribute regulations based on race to state action.77 Or it could 
be that the Court’s various approaches are actually a method of 
“unstated balancing . . . of whether or not the Constitution needs to 
apply.”78 Whatever the reason, much of the doctrine is unquestionably 
protean.  
Multiple scholars suggest replacing the Court’s current multitude 
of tests with a single, comprehensive approach.79 These proposals, 
however, are often criticized as “inherently self-defeating.”80 It is 
impossible to develop a single approach that is consistent with 
precedent and also “meaningfully separate[s] state from private 
behavior,” as every private action is influenced by the state to some 
degree.81 Rather than considering such alternative approaches, this 
 
 74. Turner, supra note 20, at 283. 
 75. Niles et al., supra note 73, at 886. 
 76. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (“It is fair to say that 
‘our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model 
of consistency.’” (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974) (“While 
the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the one 
hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”). 
 77. Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO L. REV. 
775, 780–81 (2000) (statement of Prof. Chemerinsky) (explaining, for example, that the Warren 
Court was more likely than its successors to find state action).  
 78. Id. at 807 (emphasis added); see also Fee, supra note 15, at 576 (“Scholars have faulted 
the contemporary state action doctrine for its failure to guide concrete cases in a meaningful way, 
for its tendency to hide the underlying policy issues that courts must balance, and for its harmful 
effects on the politically powerless.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 79. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and 
the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993) (proposing an 
approach to the public–private distinction by “marking out for constitutional regulation the 
affirmative use of the state’s lawmaking power”); Hala Ayoub, Comment, The State Action 
Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 918–20 (1984) (“[T]he Court 
should establish a state action theory that is equally applicable to all circumstances”); see also 
Minow, supra note 23, at 160–64 (describing seven proposed alternatives to the current state 
action doctrine). 
 80. Niles et al., supra note 73, at 889. 
 81. Id.; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State 
Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 90 (1967) (“The 
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Section instead surveys the Court’s various formulations of state action 
analysis in order to later borrow elements of each to develop a new 
framework for political candidates.  
The Court’s roving jurisprudence can be distilled into eight 
formulations of the same question: What can be fairly attributed to the 
state?82 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court appears 
to cherry-pick which approach it will apply, and parties regularly 
advocate for a finding of state action under more than one approach 
through argument in the alternative.83 Although not always referred to 
by any particular name, the Court’s opinions on state action may be 
synthesized to reflect the following approaches: (1) the state-
employment test, (2) the state-instrumentality test, (3) the public-
function test, (4) the Burton84 interdependence or symbiosis test, (5) 
the sufficiently close nexus test, (6) the compulsion or coercion test, (7) 
the joint-participation test, and (8) the Brentwood85 entwinement test.86 
1. State Employment and State Instrumentality.  The simplest tests 
to understand and apply are the state-employment and the state-
instrumentality tests. First, the employment test dictates that a 
government employee is a state actor while acting in his official 
capacity, so long as his “professional and ethical obligations [do not] 
require him to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the 
 
commitment of the Court to a single and exclusive theory of state action, or to just five such 
theories, with nicely marked limits for each, would be altogether unprincipled, in terms of the 
most vital principle of all—the reality principle.”). 
 82. Many of these formulations have shared elements, but the Author has chosen to describe 
them as eight distinct approaches to demonstrate both the doctrine’s evolution and the Court’s 
inconsistency with regard to describing and analyzing state action questions. Admittedly, the lines 
between some of the approaches can be a bit blurry and the differences may seem semantic. 
However, this Note’s ultimate goal is to create a new approach for analyzing state action in the 
context of political campaigns. As such, this comprehensive overview is useful both to show the 
wide variety of methodologies that a court may use to identify state action and to demonstrate 
that the idea of creating a novel approach for state action analysis for one specific context is not 
so absurd given the Court’s willingness to adapt its approach to fit the case before it. 
 83. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1933 (2019) 
(addressing the plaintiff-respondent’s two alternative arguments for recognizing state action). 
 84. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 85. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 86. These eight tests reflect the Author’s own synthesis of the Court’s opinions. They are not 
presented in any chronological fashion nor in terms of the Court’s seeming preference for them. 
However, the following subsections do try to indicate whether an approach has been used more 
or less frequently over time. 
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State.”87 For example, a physician contracted by the state to provide 
medical services to inmates is a state actor while performing this 
function.88 However, a public defender is not a state actor when 
performing traditional legal duties for a criminal defendant.89 Second, 
the instrumentality test signifies that government instrumentalities, 
including agencies, are considered state actors. For instance, in Lebron 
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,90 the Court found state action 
when Amtrak refused to place the plaintiff’s advertisement in Penn 
Station, in an alleged violation of his First Amendment rights.91 
Because Amtrak was a corporation created by the federal government 
to further governmental objectives and the majority of its directors 
were permanently appointed by the government, it was considered an 
instrumentality of the state for the purpose of determining its 
constitutional obligations.92 With these as a starting point, one can 
venture into the less axiomatic state action formulations, starting with 
the public-function test. 
2. Public Function.  The public-function test can be traced back to 
Marsh v. Alabama,93 where the Court held that it was unconstitutional 
to enforce a state trespassing statute against a Jehovah’s Witness who 
was distributing religious literature on the sidewalks of a privately 
owned company town.94 The Court explained that the more a private 
property owner opens that property for public use, “the more do his 
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights 
of those who use it.”95 Because the town’s citizens had “an identical 
interest in the functioning of the community,” regardless of whether 
the ownership was public or private, “the channels of communication 
[had to] remain free.”96 
 
 87. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988). 
 88. See id. at 56 (“Whether a physician is on the state payroll or is paid by contract, the 
dispositive issue concerns the relationship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner . . . . It 
is the physician’s function while working for the State . . . that determines whether he is acting 
under color of state law.”). 
 89. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). 
 90. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).  
 91. Id. at 377, 400. 
 92. Id. at 377, 394, 400. 
 93. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 94. Id. at 503, 509. 
 95. Id. at 506. 
 96. Id. at 507. 
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From this decision came the broader principle that a private party 
becomes a state actor, for purposes of constitutional claims, when that 
party serves a public function.97 But this doctrine does not mean that 
any “private entity [which] performs a function which serves the 
public” is a state actor.98 Rather, an act is a public function if it is one 
that has been traditionally and exclusively performed by the state.99 For 
example, ruling on peremptory challenges in jury selection100 and 
conducting elections101 are traditionally exclusive public functions and 
are thus transformed into state action even if carried out by private 
actors.102 In contrast, the settlement of disputes between debtors and 
creditors, even in the court system,103 and the “operation of public 
access channels on a cable system”104 are not considered traditional, 
exclusive public functions. 
Applied in only limited settings, such as those previously 
mentioned, the public-function test does not mean that “all businesses 
‘affected with the public interest’ are state actors in all their actions.”105 
However, other approaches, such as the interdependence or symbiosis 
test, do tend to sweep private conduct into the realm of state action 
more broadly. 
3. Burton Interdependence or Symbiosis.  The interdependence or 
symbiosis approach, which emphasizes a more holistic review of the 
 
 97. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (“In effect, the owner of the company 
town [in Marsh] was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of 
the State.”). 
 98. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).  
 99. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (“While many functions have been 
traditionally performed by governments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’”). 
 100. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50, 55 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant who 
used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race was a state actor); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624, 627 (1991) (holding that a private litigant in a civil case 
who used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely based on race was a state actor). 
 101. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 158 (noting that conducting elections for public office “is 
an exclusively public function,” a “clear” principle drawn from Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)). 
 102. See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54 (“[W]hen ‘a government confers on a private body 
the power to choose the government’s employees or officials, the private body will be bound by 
the constitutional mandate of race neutrality.’” (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 625)). 
 103. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 161. But see id. at 162 n.12 (“This is not to say that dispute 
resolution between creditors and debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject 
to constitutional constraints.”). 
 104. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).  
 105. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). 
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facts and circumstances surrounding the action, can be traced back to 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.106 In Burton, the Court held 
that a privately owned restaurant located within a parking building 
owned and operated by a Delaware state agency was a state actor when 
it refused to serve the plaintiff because of his race.107 Though the 
Court’s rather narrow holding was confined to the specific facts that 
the private actor was a lessee of public property,108 the Court’s 
reasoning demonstrates a much broader approach. 
The Court made clear that determining “a precise formula for 
recognition of state responsibility . . . is an ‘impossible task,’” and 
“[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious 
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance.”109 In Burton, the activities and obligations of the private 
lessee, the responsibilities of the public lessor, the mutual benefits of 
the relationship, and the location of the private restaurant in a 
government building together indicated the restaurant’s discriminatory 
practice was indeed state action.110 The Court has referred to this type 
of analysis as a test of interdependence111 or symbiosis,112 but regardless 
of the terminology, one realization emerges: this type of inquiry is 
highly fact specific. 
The Court has not relied on the Burton test with the same 
frequency as other state action formulations.113 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor strongly criticized it as one that “sweeps much too broadly 
and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of 
everyday activities.”114 However, the Court’s emphasis on a holistic 
 
 106. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 107. Id. at 716–17, 719.  
 108. See id. at 725–26 (“Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is 
that when a State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been 
the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the  
lessee . . . .”).  
 109. Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).  
 110. Id. at 724.  
 111. See id. at 725 (“The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence 
with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”). 
 112. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (“Here there is nothing 
approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in Burton.”). 
 113. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57–58 (1999) (characterizing Burton 
as merely a vaguer version of the joint-participation test established in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991 (1982) and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).  
 114. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 411 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
SMITH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:08 PM 
2021 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL 1489 
review of the facts has carried through into other, similar approaches, 
including the nexus test. 
4. Sufficiently Close Nexus.  Along the same lines as Burton, the 
nexus test is also highly fact specific.115 In this formulation, however, 
the Court asks “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the action 
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”116 In 
conducting this analysis, no single factor is dispositive, rather many 
factors must be considered in the aggregate.117  
Several are particularly relevant.118 First, a court might consider 
how heavily regulated a private entity is when assessing state action, 
though the existence of regulation without other factors is unlikely to 
result in the finding of a nexus.119 Second, whether a private party has 
a government-protected monopoly may also indicate state action, 
though the challenged action and the party’s monopoly status must be 
sufficiently connected.120 Third, a court might consider whether the 
private entity receives some kind of benefit or assistance from the 
state.121 And fourth, the receipt of public funding may denote state 
 
 115. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (“The true nature of the State’s involvement may not be 
immediately obvious, and detailed inquiry may be required in order to determine whether the 
test is met.”). 
 116. Id. at 350–51. 
 117. See id. (discussing several factors that may contribute to finding a nexus); id. at 360 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he dispositive question in any state-action case is not whether any 
single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether 
the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state responsibility.”). 
 118. What follows is a list of factors mentioned by the Court; however, this list is not 
exhaustive. 
 119. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350–51 (“[A]cts of a heavily regulated utility with at least 
something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be ‘state’ 
acts.”). 
 120. See id. at 351–52 (referring to Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), 
in which the Court disclaimed reliance on the challenged private entity’s status as a 
“congressionally established monopoly” in its state action analysis). 
 121. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991). State benefits are still not 
dispositive. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“The Court has never 
held, of course, that . . . [there is state action] if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or 
service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.”). Also, 
note that “benefit” is a more encompassing term than “funding,” and may include such things as 
statutory protections or other services provided by the state. See, e.g., id. (referencing “state-
furnished services” such as “electricity, water, and police and fire protection”). 
SMITH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:08 PM 
1490  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1473 
action, though even total dependence on this funding does not 
automatically convert private action into state action.122 
In cases before the Supreme Court, the nexus test has not often 
produced a finding of state action, even after consideration of these 
factors.123 Although this approach remains good law and is frequently 
cited,124 what exactly constitutes a sufficiently close nexus is unclear. 
5. Compulsion or Coercion.  Unlike the Burton and nexus 
formulations, the Court has been much more direct when it comes to 
finding state action based on compulsion by the state. As articulated in 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress,125 “a State is responsible for the . . . act of a 
private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”126 For 
example, it is state action where a private restaurant refuses to serve 
people based on race because a city ordinance requires segregated 
eating facilities.127 That said, there is a distinction between compulsion 
 
 122. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840, 843 (1982) (finding no state action when 
a private school discharged an employee without due process even though it depended on the 
state for virtually all of its funding).  
 123. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347, 358 (holding it was not state action for a utility 
company, though extensively regulated and possessing a state-protected monopoly, to terminate 
a woman’s service without notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay her debts); Moose Lodge 
No. 107, 407 U.S. at 171–72, 177 (deciding it was not state action for a private club to refuse service 
to a customer based on race, even though the club was only permitted to sell alcoholic beverages 
because the state liquor board had issued the club a license); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837, 840, 
843 (ruling it was not state action for a private school, primarily funded with public funds, to 
discharge a school counselor without due process for exercising her First Amendment rights). 
 124. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (“Thus, the private 
insurers in this case will not be held to constitutional standards unless ‘there is a sufficiently close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity . . . .’”); Rawson v. 
Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the “close nexus” test); 
Preston v. New York, 223 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the “sufficiently 
close nexus” and “symbiotic relationships” tests); Eaton v. Univ. of Del., C.A. No. 00-709, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10762, at *10–13 (D. Del. July 31, 2001) (concluding that a university’s action 
was state action under both the nexus and symbiosis tests because the state had explicitly 
conferred powers to the university to appoint law enforcement officers, provided it with benefits 
(such as land grants and tax advantages), was involved in setting curriculum requirements, and 
the governor sat on the university’s board of trustees).  
 125. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 126. Id. at 170. 
 127. Id. 
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and permission,128 and only the former results in an automatic finding 
of state action.129  
Beyond explicit compulsion, the Court has also found state action 
where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must 
in law be deemed to be that of the State.”130 In the same way that state 
permission is not considered compulsion, state inaction is not 
“authorization” or “encouragement” by the state, at least for the sake 
of the coercion test.131 
6. Joint Participation.  Despite its seeming reluctance to find state 
action where there is mere acquiescence or permission under the 
coercion or compulsion test, the Court has found state action where 
the private party engaged in “joint participation” with the state.132 A 
private party acts “‘under color’ of law” when “he is a willful 
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”133 For example, 
in Lugar, the Court found state action where the defendant, through 
an ex parte, prejudgment petition, acted jointly with the state to attach 
the plaintiff’s property without due process.134 The Court later clarified, 
in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,135 that “[p]rivate 
use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to 
the level of state action . . . . But when private parties make use of state 
procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state 
action may be found.”136 Judicial enforcement of private agreements 
alone, however, does not typically constitute state action.137 
 
 128. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (“[T]he State of New York is in 
no way responsible for Flagg Brothers’ decision, a decision which the State in § 7-210 permits but 
does not compel . . . .”). This distinction is probably most clearly exemplified by a statute reading 
“an individual must” versus “an individual may.” Additionally, the Court has rejected arguments 
by plaintiffs that the completion of state-mandated forms and paperwork indicates state action. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 55. 
 129. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164 (“This Court, however, has never held that a State’s 
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State.”). 
 130. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
 131. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 54. 
 132. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). 
 133. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966). 
 134. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941–42. 
 135. Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
 136. Id. at 485–86.  
 137. Fee, supra note 15, at 582. One exception is presented in Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the 
Court found state action when private actors relied on court enforcement of private agreements 
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C. A Twenty-First Century Development: Brentwood Entwinement  
Over the years, the conservative wing of the Court has evinced a 
preference for a “‘rule-oriented’ approach” to state action that favors 
more concrete tests, such as the public-function or coercion tests, yet 
the liberal wing tends to prefer a more “totality of the circumstances” 
approach.138 As the “precedential zoo” developed through the 
twentieth century, the conservative view appeared to dominate.139 But 
at the turn of the twenty-first century, the Court provided a new 
formulation of the same type of fact-intensive inquiry used in the 
Burton and nexus cases.140  
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association, the Court considered whether the enforcement of a rule 
against a member school by a statewide association responsible for 
regulating interscholastic athletic competition among public and 
private high schools could be considered state action.141 Citing the 
nexus test, the Court explained that “what is fairly attributable [to the 
state] is a matter of normative judgment, . . . [and] no one fact can 
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state 
action.”142 Even so, that normative judgment should be based on a 
finding that “[t]he nominally private character of the [entity] is 
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and 
public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no 
substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional 
standards.”143 
 
that included race-based restrictive covenants. Id. at 581–82 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948)). The Shelley Court explained that the state “ha[d] made available . . . the full coercive 
power of government to deny” the plaintiffs equal protection of the law, and that “the action of 
state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities” is always regarded as state action. 
334 U.S. at 14, 19. However, this case is considered an anomaly and has not since been relied 
upon. Fee, supra note 15, at 582. 
 138. Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2006). 
 139. Id. at 1382, 1391–92. 
 140. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.3. While both are fact-intensive, Brentwood takes a slightly 
more formulaic approach to the holistic review endorsed by Burton, focusing on both top-down 
and bottom-up entwinement of the state and the private entity. See infra notes 141–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 141. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 290 (2001). 
 142. Id. at 295. 
 143. Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
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Without providing an exact definition of “pervasive 
entwinement,” the Court suggested that it exists when the relevant 
facts indicate a “largely overlapping identity” between the state and 
the private entity.144 Here, 84 percent of the association’s membership 
consisted of public schools, and each member school had a 
representative who voted for the association’s governing bodies.145 In 
addition to this bottom-up entwinement, there was top-down 
entwinement in that members of the Tennessee State Board of 
Education served on the association’s governing bodies, and 
association employees received the same state retirement benefits as 
state employees.146 On these facts, the Court held that the association 
had engaged in state action.147 
Even though it found state action, the Court acknowledged that 
facts indicating entwinement “may be outweighed in the name of some 
value at odds with finding public accountability in the 
circumstances.”148 However, the Court was fairly vague in explaining 
what would constitute a “substantial reason to claim unfairness.”149 It 
rejected the association’s argument that its classification as a state actor 
would result in “an epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation” and 
that “the social utility of expanding [the] class [of possible defendant 
actors]” weighed against this classification.150  
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in Brentwood, fearing the 
majority’s unprecedented holding “not only extend[ed] state-action 
doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroache[d] upon the 
realm of individual freedom that the doctrine was meant to protect.”151 
That said, Justice Thomas may not yet have much to fear, as the 
entwinement test has been applied—though inconsistently—rather 
 
 144. Id. at 303 (emphasizing that “entwinement”—like “‘[c]oercion’ and ‘encouragement’”—
is another way of “referring to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private 
action as public instead”). 
 145. Id. at 299–300. 
 146. Id. at 300. 
 147. Id. at 302. 
 148. Id. at 303. 
 149. Id. at 298. 
 150. Id. at 304–05. 
 151. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 314–15 (“Because the majority never 
defines ‘entwinement,’ the scope of its holding is unclear . . . . I am not prepared to say that any 
private organization that permits public entities and public officials to participate acts as the State 
in anything or everything it does . . . .”). 
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narrowly in the circuit courts.152 Further, in a 2019 opinion, Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, did not even mention 
entwinement in his examples of the “few limited circumstances” in 
which a private entity qualifies as a state actor.153 Nonetheless, 
entwinement is now a part of the state action doctrine and opens up 
the possibility that new, more fact-intensive approaches to state action 
analysis—such as the framework this Note proposes in the campaign 
context—may be permissible. 
III.  THE CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS STATE ACTORS 
Again, plaintiffs can vindicate constitutional violations committed 
by private parties if the private action is found to actually constitute 
state action—an analysis for which the Court has developed several 
approaches over the years. This Part examines how the doctrine has 
been applied to find state action on the part of seemingly private 
political parties. 
A. Political Parties and the White Primary Cases  
Political parties154 walk the line between private and public.155 
Though “not formally one of the national political institutions,” parties 
 
 152. See, e.g., P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc., 808 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(deciding there was no entwinement between the state and a private operator of highway service 
plazas because there was no personnel overlap or specific involvement of the state in the 
challenged activity—the decision to remove brochures for a “gentleman’s club” from the plaza 
common areas); Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps., 768 F.3d 259, 269 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (holding there was no entwinement between the state and a private nonprofit 
contracted by the state to provide emergency medical and ambulance services because the 
nonprofit did not receive the majority of its funding from the town, and the town did not have any 
say in the nonprofit’s management or personnel decisions); Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 
1205 (10th Cir. 2002) (comparing the entwinement test to the symbiosis test and citing the 
dictionary definition of “entwine”—“to twine together, to interweave, attach or involve 
inextricably in sentiment or thought”—in arriving at its conclusion). 
 153. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (listing “(i) 
when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government 
compels the private entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly 
with the private entity” (citations omitted)). 
 154. This Note defines “political party” as “an association, committee, or organization which 
nominates [or selects] a candidate for election to . . . office whose name appears on [an] election 
ballot as the candidate of [the] association, committee, or organization.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(16) 
(2018). 
 155. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A 
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 777 (2000) (“The crux of the 
problem political parties pose for lawyers and judges derives from parties’ uncertain 
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play an essential role in the maintenance of American democracy.156 
The white primary cases—which predate many of the cases described 
above—assessed whether the actions of political parties could be 
considered state action.157 
In the first of the three white primary cases, Nixon v. Condon,158 
the Texas Democratic Party, through its State Executive Committee, 
adopted a resolution that only white Democrats could vote in the 
primary.159 The Committee was empowered by statute to adopt 
resolutions determining primary voter qualifications, but it did not 
have the inherent power to do so.160 Because the Committee’s authority 
derived entirely from the state, the Court held that the party had 
“become to that extent [an] organ[] of the State itself, [a] repositor[y] 
of official power.”161 By granting the political party this authority—
which the Court recognized as especially significant, as it caused the 
party to then become the means by which government itself is 
established and continued—the state had discharged its functions so as 
to discriminate on the basis of race. Thus, the Court determined that 
the party’s action was state action.162 
The Court again relied upon the role of the primary as an “integral 
part of the election machinery”163 to find state action in Smith v. 
Allwright.164 There, the Texas Democratic Party independently 
adopted a resolution at its State Convention limiting party membership 
 
constitutional and legal status . . . . A substantial amount of the caselaw in this area rests on 
whether judges switch on the state actor toggle.”). 
 156. See Robert C. Wigton, American Political Parties Under the First Amendment, 7 J.L. & 
POL’Y 411, 413–14 (1999) (“[P]olitical parties . . . have long provided what may be considered 
quasi-governmental services, including candidate recruitment, the operation of political 
campaigns, and the supervision of the voting process.”). 
 157. Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001). The following cases do not 
specifically refer to one or more of the tests described in supra Part II by name. Even so, elements 
of each test are present in the Court’s analysis, including elements of the public-function, 
instrumentality, compulsion, and joint-participation approaches. 
 158. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
 159. Id. at 82. 
 160. Id. at 88. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 88–89. 
 163. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318–20 (1941). 
 164. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
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to white individuals.165 Unlike Condon, there was no state statute or 
other grant of power influencing the party’s decision regarding its 
membership.166 The party claimed it was permitted to adopt such a 
resolution because as a “voluntary organization,” it was “free to select 
its own membership.”167 The Court rejected this argument, however, 
holding instead that because the party was required to abide by a 
statutory system in order for its nominees to appear on the general 
election ballot, the party was “an agency of the state” for the 
determination of primary election participation.168 “When primaries 
become a part of the machinery for choosing officials,” the state, in 
adopting a general election ballot of party nominees, “endorses, adopts 
and enforces the discrimination . . . practiced by [the] party.”169 
Therefore, the party’s action was considered state action.170 
In 1953, the Court took its reasoning in Smith a step further. In 
Terry v. Adams,171 the Jaybird Democratic Association, a voluntary 
political organization, excluded Black individuals from participating in 
its primaries.172 The winners of the Jaybird primary nearly always 
entered the subsequent Democratic primary and won the 
nomination.173 In his plurality opinion, Justice Hugo Black found that 
the Jaybird primary had become an “integral part . . . of the elective 
process,” even though neither the state nor the party controlled any 
aspect of the Jaybird elections.174 Because the Democratic primary and 
general election had become “no more than the perfunctory ratifiers 
of the choice that ha[d] already been made in [the] Jaybird election[],” 
it was immaterial that the state did not directly control the Jaybird 
primary process.175 Because “the effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird 
primary plus Democratic primary plus general election” resulted in the 
 
 165. Id. at 656–57. The right to vote in the Democratic primary was conditioned on party 
membership. Id.  
 166. Klarman, supra note 157, at 59.  
 167. Smith, 321 U.S. at 657.  
 168. Id. at 663 (“The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon 
it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed 
by a political party.”). 
 169. Id. at 664. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 172. Id. at 462–63 (plurality opinion).  
 173. Id. at 463. 
 174. Id. at 469. 
 175. Id.  
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deprivation of Black individuals’ rights to vote, the Jaybird Association 
was held to be a state actor.176 In his concurring opinion, Justice Tom 
Clark explained this principle even more broadly: 
Any “part of the machinery for choosing officials” becomes subject 
to the Constitution’s restraints . . . . [W]hen a state structures its 
electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political 
organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that 
organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of 
government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play.177 
The white primary cases were the first instances of the Court 
finding state action due to its recognition of the essential role that 
political parties play in the democratic process. This reasoning has 
since been even further expanded. 
B. Modern Treatment of Political Parties 
Beyond the white primary cases, the Court has treated political 
parties as state actors in other circumstances as well.178 For example, in 
Gray v. Sanders,179 the Court determined that the Georgia Democratic 
primary’s use of the “county unit system”180 violated the “one person, 
one vote” principle.181 Because the state “adopts the primary as a part 
of the public election machinery[,] . . . state regulation of this 
preliminary phase of the election process makes it state action.”182 
 
 176. See id. at 469–70 (holding that by depriving Black individuals of the right to vote, the 
Texas Democratic Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 177. Id. at 481, 484 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 
U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).  
 178. Similar to the white primary cases, these cases do not refer to a particular state action 
test by name. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. However, the Court’s reasoning seems 
to borrow elements from the public-function, interdependence or symbiosis, nexus, and joint-
participation approaches. 
 179. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 180. Under this system, each county had a specific number of representatives in the state 
legislature. Id. at 370–71. Candidates for primary nominations who won the popular vote in each 
county were entitled “to two votes for each representative to which the county is entitled.” Id. at 
371. “[T]he majority of the county unit vote nominated a United States Senator and Governor; 
the plurality of the county unit vote nominated the others.” Id. According to the plaintiff, this 
worked out so that one unit vote in a county comprising of 14.11 percent of Georgia’s total 
population represented 92,721 residents, whereas one unit vote in a county comprising 0.05 
percent of the state’s total population represented 938 residents. Id.  
 181. Id. at 381. 
 182. Id. at 374–75. 
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Following a similar line of reasoning, in Morse v. Republican Party 
of Virginia,183 the Court held that the Virginia Republican Party was 
acting under the authority of the state184 when it required a party 
registration fee to participate in the primary.185 Justice John Paul 
Stevens, in his plurality opinion, explained that because the state has 
sole authority to set qualifications for ballot access and reserves two 
places on its ballot for the major parties, the parties are effectively 
“delegated the power to determine part of the field of candidates from 
which the voters must choose.”186 By accepting the party’s selection, 
the state “‘endorses, adopts and enforces’ the delegate qualifications 
set by the Party for the right to choose that nominee.”187  
Like in Gray, the Morse Court explained that it is “‘recognition of 
the place of the primary in the electoral scheme,’ rather than the degree 
of state control over it,” that indicates state action when the party is 
granted authority to determine primary-voter qualifications.188 These 
cases make clear that political parties are especially susceptible to 
crossing the line between private and state action due to the 
fundamental role they play in the maintenance of American 
democracy.189 This realization, however, raises the questions: How far 
can this reasoning reach? Could it ever extend past the party to the 
candidate herself? 
IV.  POLITICAL CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGNS AS STATE ACTORS 
Over time, the political campaign has shifted from smaller 
operations—which focused mostly on retail politics with a larger 
 
 183. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996). 
 184. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Republican Party of Virginia was subject 
to the same preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act as the state of Virginia. Id. 
at 190 (plurality opinion). Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the “operative test” for 
determining whether the political party is subject to § 5 is “whether [the] political party exercises 
power over the electoral process.” Id. at 218. 
 185. See id. at 190, 199–200 (“In concluding that the regulation applies to the Party, we are 
guided by the reasoning of Smith v. Allwright, [321 U.S. 649 (1944)] . . . .”). 
 186. Id. at 197–98 (quoting Smith, 321 U.S. at 664). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 199 (quoting Smith, 321 U.S. at 660). 
 189. The Court has stated it will not interject itself into the inner workings of the political 
party organization. See O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972) (per curiam) (“[No] court 
has . . . interject[ed] itself into the deliberative processes of a national political 
convention . . . . [T]he convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party 
disputes . . . .”).  
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emphasis on the political party—to what scholars call the “new-style” 
of electioneering.190 Now, “[t]he candidate, rather than the 
party, . . . tends to be the chief focus of . . . campaign 
communication.”191 However, political parties today are not totally 
irrelevant. To the contrary, they have transformed “into ‘service-
oriented’ organizations” that provide candidates with financial and 
human capital, as well as “serve as ‘brokers,’ linking ‘candidates and 
interest groups, the individual contributors, the political consultants, 
and the powerful incumbents who possess some of the money, political 
contacts, and campaign experience that candidates need.’”192 That said, 
as elections become more candidate centric, and thus campaigns 
become an even more integral part of the elective process,193 it would 
logically follow that the actions of political candidates and their 
campaign organizations should be assessed more closely for possible 
state action. 
A. A New Framework for Assessing Political Candidates and 
Campaigns for State Action 
Because there is no single state action test and the approaches 
detailed above are particularly fact intensive,194 it would be impossible 
to argue that political candidates are categorically state actors for the 
purposes of constitutional tort claims. However, based on the Court’s 
precedents, courts should consider several factors when determining 
the threshold question of whether a political candidate and her 
campaign can be considered a state actor.195 Abiding by state action 
precedent, no one factor is dispositive, nor will each factor be relevant 
to every approach outlined in Part II. However, as constitutional torts 
and the campaign trail collide, the following considerations weigh in 
favor of holding political candidates and their campaigns to be state 
 
 190. MICHAEL BURTON, WILLIAM J. MILLER & DANIEL M. SHEA, CAMPAIGN CRAFT: THE 
STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND ART OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT xv–xvi (5th ed. 
2015). 
 191. Id. at xviii (quoting ROBERT AGRANOFF, THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 4 
(1972)). 
 192. Id. (quoting PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 111 (6th ed. 2012)). 
 193. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text (describing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953)). 
 194. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 195. Although many of the examples in the following analysis refer to federal elections, the 
framework here is not limited to federal elections. The factors outlined may very well play a role 
in elections at the state and local levels and should be considered by courts accordingly. 
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actors, under either a current or new test designed to assess state action 
in the context of modern election realities.  
First, as incorporated from the nexus test,196 courts should 
recognize that political campaigns and elections are extensively 
regulated.197 To start, the state determines who is permitted to run for 
which office,198 as Smith emphasized.199 Then, the state establishes the 
process for a candidate to run—this includes certain paperwork 
requirements, filing fees, disclosure requirements, and so on.200 
Campaign finance is also the subject of detailed regulation. For 
instance, the Federal Election Campaign Act201 sets limits on political 
contributions, requires candidates to report from where their money is 
raised and how it is spent, and provides for oversight and enforcement 
by the Federal Election Commission.202 Granted, many industries are 
extensively regulated, and the Court has emphasized that mere 
regulation alone does not indicate state action.203 However, given the 
critical importance of election regulations to preserving the democratic 
 
 196. See supra Part II.B.4 (describing the nexus test). 
 197. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining that courts may consider the 
extensive regulation of a challenged activity, though mere regulation is not alone enough to find 
state action). For a summary of election laws, see Voting and Election Laws, USA.GOV (Sept. 1, 
2020), https://www.usa.gov/voting-laws [https://perma.cc/B8D7-P77X].  
 198. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (requiring that an individual running for president 
be at least thirty-five years of age, a natural-born U.S. citizen, and a resident of the United States 
for fourteen years); Who Can Become a Candidate for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/who-can-
become-a-candidate-for-state-legislator.aspx [https://perma.cc/H5PU-STN7] (listing each state’s 
eligibility requirements for state legislators). 
 199. See supra notes 168–68 and accompanying text. 
 200. See, e.g., Filing Fees for Candidates for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 16, 2020) http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/filing-
fees-for-candidates-for-state-legislators.aspx [https://perma.cc/48CR-HZZR] (listing the filing 
fees for state-legislature candidates in the thirty-three states that require major party candidates 
to pay such fees); Paperwork Requirements for Filing as a Candidate for State Legislator, NAT’L 
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/paperwork-requirements-for-filing-as-a-candidate-for-state-legislator.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5XT6-PMTT] (listing each state’s paperwork requirements for state-legislature 
candidates). 
 201. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2018). 
 202. See Contribution Limits, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits [https://perma.cc/
HS5U-G7XR] (listing, for example, contribution limits for individual donors to candidate 
committees and PACs for the 2019–20 federal-election cycle). 
 203. This point was reemphasized as recently as 2019 in Manhattan Community Access Corp. 
v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019). 
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institutions that the Constitution was designed to protect, perhaps a 
slight divergence from precedent is appropriate. That is, in the political 
context, the nature of the state’s heavy involvement in election 
regulation should be considered a more relevant factor in the state 
action analysis than perhaps regulation of an industry less vital to 
democracy, such as utilities.204 
Second, and relatedly, courts should consider the involvement of 
public funding in political campaigns. Doing so would be consistent 
with both the nexus and Burton approaches. To address concerns that 
elections could be bought by private interest groups, public-election 
funding programs began in the 1970s with the Presidential Public 
Funding Program (“PPFP”).205 Through PPFP, candidates for 
president seeking nomination in a political party’s primary are eligible 
for primary matching funds from the federal government,206 and major 
party nominees in the general election are eligible to receive $20 
million plus a cost of living adjustment—in 2020, this would have been 
$103.7 million—in exchange for foregoing all private contributions.207 
These programs are funded through the Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund, which is raised through the three-dollar check-off on 
the 1040 federal income tax form.208 
 
 204. Cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (stating that the extensive 
regulation of an electric company did not alone transform its action into state action). 
 205. See generally MICHAEL G. MILLER, SUBSIDIZING DEMOCRACY (2013) (discussing 
public-election funding in the United States). 
 206. To receive this funding, the candidate must raise more than five thousand dollars in each 
of at least twenty states and receive contributions from a minimum of twenty separate donors in 
each state. Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://
www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/understanding-ways-support-federal-candidates/
presidential-elections/public-funding-presidential-elections [https://perma.cc/FA8S-YQ23]. 
Additionally, the candidate must limit campaign spending for all primary elections combined to 
$10 million plus a cost-of-living adjustment—in 2020, this national spending limit amounted to 
$51.85 million—and campaign spending in each state must be limited to a specific amount based 
on the number of potential voters in a state. Id.; Presidential Spending Limits for 2020, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/understanding-public-
funding-presidential-elections/presidential-spending-limits-2020 [https://perma.cc/TP44-799L]. 
 207. Id. Some partial public funding is available for minor- and new-party candidates who 
meet certain vote-share requirements. Id. Notably, no major party nominee in the presidential 
election has accepted public funding since John McCain did so in 2008. See id. (noting that 2008 
was “the last year a major party candidate chose to accept a general election grant”); FEC 
Certifies Funds for McCain General Election Campaign, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Sept. 8, 2008), 
https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-certifies-funds-for-mccain-general-election-campaign [https://
perma.cc/8MDG-DTY2] (announcing that the FEC had “approved payment of $84.1 million in 
federal funds for the general election campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin”).  
 208. Public Funding of Presidential Elections, supra note 206. 
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Since PPFP’s creation, fourteen states have also provided some 
form of public financing option for state campaigns, either in the form 
of “clean election” bills—which provide full funding for the 
campaign—or matching funds, which offer partial funding up to a 
specific amount.209 Scholars find that these public funding programs 
can impact election outcomes, and some argue that they decrease the 
electoral incumbency advantage by approximately 50 percent.210 Even 
if the decrease in incumbency advantage is not so marked, it is clear 
that public funding does increase competitiveness in elections by 
encouraging new candidates to enter the race.211 Public funding’s 
potential to impact the outcome of an election makes the acceptance 
of such funding weigh in favor of a finding of state action, though the 
exact weight may vary depending on the amount of public funding 
accepted compared to a candidate’s total fundraising.  
Third, courts should take into account, in addition to public 
funding, whether a political candidate has received other benefits 
throughout her campaign that would suggest a closer relationship 
between the candidate and the state, similar to the Court’s analysis in 
Burton.212 For example, major party nominees generally have an easier 
time accessing the ballot compared to unaffiliated candidates,213 as 
Terry acknowledged.214 Additionally, at the federal level, the U.S. 
Secret Service provides protection to “[m]ajor Presidential and Vice 
 
 209. Public Financing of Campaigns: Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 8, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview
.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4KZ-CLJ6]. 
 210. Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 
14 (Jan. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
Hall-2014-Tax-Financing-And-Polarization.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9EN-9X4P]. 
 211. Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from 
Arizona and Maine, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 277 (2008) (“[T]he empirical evidence on 
public financing suggests that these programs do not simply fill the coffers of unserious and low-
quality candidates, but rather they help serious contestants mount effective challenges.”). 
 212. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 213. See generally Summary: State Laws Regarding Presidential Ballot Access for the General 
Election, NAT’L ASS’N SEC’YS STATE (Jan. 2020), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/
2020-07/research-ballot-access-president-Jan200.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS72-WSES] (providing 
an overview of state legislation regarding presidential-ballot access for party-affiliated and 
independent candidates). 
 214. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
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Presidential candidates,” as determined by the secretary of Homeland 
Security.215 
The final factor courts should consider is a candidate’s status as an 
incumbent or challenger. Political science literature has identified a 
clear incumbency advantage in U.S. elections.216 For instance, 
incumbents receive free publicity and frequent constituent interaction 
while in office.217 Thus, even though incumbents are campaigning for 
reelection in their personal capacity, the fact that they are a state actor 
in their official capacity makes them more likely to defeat any non-
“official state actor” challengers. Placing some weight on a candidate’s 
status as an incumbent when analyzing their conduct for state action 
would help to address the current illogical distinction between 
incumbents acting in their official versus private capacity.218 
Additionally, from a Brentwood entwinement perspective,219 an 
incumbent candidate’s campaign is more likely to have a “largely 
overlapping identity” with the state.220 After all, the candidate herself 
is a government official, and it is likely that other government officials 
will also be involved in the incumbent’s reelection efforts.221 Granted, 
some of the government officials would be acting in their personal 
capacities due to limitations on the political activity of government 
 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7) (2018); see also Frequently Asked Questions: 2020 Presidential 
Campaign, U.S. SECRET SERV., https://www.secretservice.gov/about/faqs [https://perma.cc/
WDD2-FY56] (explaining in further detail how the Secret Service selects presidential and vice-
presidential candidates for protection). 
 216. See generally, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency 
Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942–2000, 1 ELECTION 
L.J. 315 (2002) (providing a comprehensive overview of the incumbency advantage in state and 
federal elections).  
 217. Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 569 
(1999). 
 218. Admittedly, a valid counterargument to this suggestion is that placing weight on a 
candidate’s incumbency status may unfairly subject incumbent candidates to more claims than 
challengers. While this is a possibility, this framework specifically does not designate exactly how 
much weight to apply to each factor, including incumbency status. Therefore, courts applying this 
framework will need to grapple with this question of fairness when deciding how heavily to weigh 
a candidate’s incumbency status against them. 
 219. See supra Part II.C. 
 220. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303 (2001). 
 221. For example, in 2011, President Barack Obama authorized several senior West Wing 
officials to communicate directly with his 2012 reelection campaign’s Chicago office and the 
Democratic National Committee. Glenn Thrush & Josh Gerstein, Campaigning from the White 
House, POLITICO (July 22, 2011, 4:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/07/campaigning-
from-the-white-house-059631 [https://perma.cc/Y4QF-JAA5]. 
SMITH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:08 PM 
1504  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1473 
employees put in place by legislation such as the Hatch Act.222 
However, the line between an incumbent acting in her official capacity 
as a state actor and an incumbent acting in her personal capacity as a 
political candidate and potential state actor is blurry at best.223 For 
instance, President Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign faced 
accusations of Hatch Act violations when the president “deliver[ed] his 
acceptance speech to the Republican National Convention from the 
South Lawn of the White House” after receiving the party’s 
nomination as its candidate for the 2020 presidential election.224 This 
separation of personal and official realms may work for lower-level 
employees who have the benefit of anonymity among the general 
public. But this separation is far less effective when the state official is 
one the public recognizes in both her personal and official capacities 
and who seeks to benefit from that publicity as a candidate. One cannot 
so easily separate the state from the incumbent, whether the incumbent 
is running for reelection or campaigning on behalf of someone else.225 
To summarize, all of these factors—regulation, financing, other 
special benefits, and incumbency status—support a conclusion that 
political candidates and their campaigns are state actors in certain 
circumstances. Hearkening back to Justice Clark’s concurrence in 
Terry, political candidates are an essential “part of the machinery for 
choosing officials,” as they themselves are the choices among which the 
 
 222. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2018). Notably, the Hatch Act does not apply to the 
president or vice president. Id. § 7322(1). For a full summary of permissible and prohibited 
political activities under the Hatch Act, see CYNTHIA BROWN & JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R44469, HATCH ACT RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 11–12 (2016). 
 223. This absurdity is depicted humorously in an episode of the television show Parks and 
Recreation. In the episode, the main character, Leslie Knope, who is deputy director of her city’s 
parks and recreation department, is also running for the position of city councilwoman. While in 
her office at City Hall, she is approached by her campaign manager to approve a design for a new 
campaign poster. After calling her manager a “beautiful rule-breaking moth,” Knope proceeds to 
walk through City Hall to an exterior door, takes one step outside, looks at the poster and says, 
“Yes,” before returning immediately to work. Parks and Recreation: Sweet Sixteen (NBC 
television broadcast Feb. 23, 2012). 
 224. Zach Montague, What Is the Hatch Act? Is Trump Violating It at the R.N.C.?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3lkPYIx [https://perma.cc/S45L-LQZ9]. 
 225. See, e.g., Alexander Burns & Gardiner Harris, Big Names Campaigning for Hillary 
Clinton Underscore Donald Trump’s Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), https://nyti.ms/
2emgHRf [https://perma.cc/QB8L-PP8U] (noting that President Obama, Vice President Joe 
Biden, and Senator Bernie Sanders campaigned for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential 
election). 
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electorate must pick.226 Because the electorate is limited to choosing 
only from the candidates who run, the candidates are the exclusive 
choices for public office and they ought to “take[] on those attributes 
of government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play.”227 
From a policy perspective, individuals who are campaigning to earn a 
position as a state actor should have to demonstrate their willingness 
and ability to abide by the constitutional restraints that would be 
imposed upon them if they were to win the election. It seems illogical 
that one could disregard the Constitution in pursuit of a position whose 
oath is to defend it.  
B. Implications of State Actor Classification on Political Candidates  
Though this Note focuses specifically on the threshold 
requirement of state action, this would be fruitless if the classification 
of political candidates as state actors lacked tangible implications. 
Without attempting to describe the full set of scenarios in which 
political candidates could be liable for constitutional violations if they 
were to be classified as state actors, one could hypothesize that the 
majority of these violations would occur in the context of equal 
protection and First Amendment rights. 
First, the Court is more apt to find state action when equal 
protection with regard to race is at stake.228 With tactics such as racial 
priming229 seemingly on the rise in political campaigns,230 various 
 
 226. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)). 
 227. Id. at 484. 
 228. See supra Part III.A (discussing the white primary cases). 
 229. See Michael Tesler, Racial Priming with Implicit and Explicit Messages, OXFORD RSCH. 
ENCYC. 3 (May 2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.00
01/acrefore-9780190228637-e-49?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/42DE-ALCX] (“Racial priming is 
typically defined as the increased impact of racial attitudes on evaluations of relevant political 
candidates or policies.”). See generally Nicholas A. Valentino, Vincent L. Hutchings & Ismail K. 
White, Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns, 96 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 75 (2002) (providing an overview of racial priming in political campaigns). 
 230. See, e.g., Zack Budryk, Castro: Trump ‘Thinks He’s Going to Win in 2020’ Through 
‘Racial Priming,’ HILL (July 28, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-
shows/455060-castro-trump-thinks-hes-going-to-win-in-2020-through-racial [https://perma.cc/
93V7-RE6R] (noting that a Democratic presidential candidate had described Trump’s “attacks” 
on a Black congressman as being “part of a broader ‘racial priming’ strategy to shore up the 
president’s re-election support”); Sarah McCammon, From Debate Stage, Trump Declines To 
Denounce White Supremacy, NPR (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/30/
918483794/from-debate-stage-trump-declines-to-denounce-white-supremacy [https://perma.cc/
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constitutional tort claims could imaginably be brought against political 
candidates and their campaigns for violations of equal protection.  
Second, given the nature of elections and campaigning, violations 
of the right to free speech may also make courts more open to a finding 
of state action. This would align with the Court’s own comments on the 
First Amendment’s importance to the maintenance of democracy—
namely, that the First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent 
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 
office.”231 For instance, if political candidates were state actors, then 
protestors removed from campaign rallies could seek redress for the 
violation of their First Amendment rights.232 Additionally, beyond the 
protestor examples, political candidates could also be liable for the 
online censorship of political speech through social media. For 
example, the Second Circuit recently upheld a decision holding that 
Trump engaged in “‘unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination’ . . . when he blocked certain Twitter users.”233 If a 
political candidate engaged in similar behavior, a court may find her 
liable as a state actor using the framework this Note proposes. 
 
3TFC-N8JQ] (“President Trump’s hesitation, once again, to denounce white supremacy during 
Tuesday’s presidential debate is drawing quick condemnation from anti-racism activists . . . .”). 
 231. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The right of 
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition 
to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”). 
 232. This Note does not discuss the complexities of First Amendment free speech and protest 
doctrine. However, to address the likely counterargument that political candidates must retain 
the right to control their message in order to effectively campaign, one must acknowledge that 
not all removal of protestors from campaign rallies would be a constitutional violation. For 
instance, at a Hillary Clinton rally in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2015, protestors from the Black Lives 
Matter movement were removed from the rally after loudly chanting and waving signs for almost 
thirty minutes despite repeated requests to quiet down. Dan Merica, Hillary Clinton Protested by 
Black Lives Matter, CNN (Oct. 31, 2015, 10:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/politics/
hillary-clinton-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/K2RX-GVXM]. In situations such as this, 
state law provides for criminal penalties for the unlawful disturbance of assemblies and 
disturbance of the peace if certain levels of interruption are reached. Eugene Volokh, Is It a Crime 
To Heckle at a Campaign Rally?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 14, 2016, 5:34 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/14/is-it-a-crime-to-heckle-
at-a-campaign-rally [https://perma.cc/U42U-U7AX]. Thus, candidates still retain the ability to 
communicate their message, and peaceful protestors retain their right to free speech. 
 233. Vanessa Romo, U.S. Appeals Court Rules Trump Violated 1st Amendment by Blocking 
Twitter Followers, NPR (July 9, 2019, 3:38 PM) (quoting Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 2019)), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/09/
739906562/u-s-appeals-court-rules-trump-violated-first-amendment-by-blocking-twitter-follo 
[https://perma.cc/65AS-LQQQ]. 
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Along the same rationale, infringements of the freedom of the 
press by political candidates may also warrant a finding of state action. 
For instance, on December 2, 2019, the Trump reelection campaign 
announced that it would “no longer credential Bloomberg News 
reporters to cover its events,” accusing the news organization of bias in 
its coverage of the campaign.234 This example illustrates the fourth 
factor discussed in the previous section—the otherwise illogical 
distinction between incumbent candidates acting in their personal 
versus official capacity. If Trump were to refuse access to a news 
organization in his capacity as a state actor, it would clearly trigger 
constitutional concerns.235 This supports a conclusion that the same 
activity done in his capacity as a candidate should also be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.236 
CONCLUSION 
As modern politics become increasingly candidate centric and 
individual campaigns play a more integral part in the election process, 
the natural next step is to extend the logic of the white primary cases 
to candidates and campaigns to find that political actors are sometimes 
state actors. As courts navigate this uncharted territory, the Court’s 
many formulations of the state action doctrine can be synthesized into 
a new framework for this context, which would include consideration 
of factors like regulation, funding, benefits, and incumbency status. 
Though political candidates are not categorically state actors, those 
 
 234. Alex Wayne, Trump Campaign Says It Will Shut Out Bloomberg News from Events, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2019, 6:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-02/trump-
campaign-says-it-will-shut-out-bloomberg-news-from-events [https://perma.cc/FYT6-7VVT].  
 235. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Judge Hands CNN a Victory in Its Bid To Restore Jim Acosta’s White 
House Press Pass, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/judge-hands-cnn-victory-in-its-bid-to-restore-jim-acostas-white-house-press-pass/
2018/11/16/8bedd08a-e920-11e8-a939-9469f1166f9d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9KC8-XFPC] 
(reporting that after the Trump administration revoked the White House press pass of a CNN 
reporter, a federal judge ordered the White House to temporarily restore the credentials, citing 
primarily Fifth Amendment due process concerns, though not ruling out possible First 
Amendment implications as well). 
 236. Note that if it was instead a challenger refusing access to a news organization, it may be 
trickier to find state action using the proposed framework, though certainly not impossible. 
Factual analysis of factors such as regulation, funding, and other benefits would still be required. 
Additionally, for a challenger candidate, it may still be worth considering whether there is much 
overlap between campaign officials and other state officials. Finally, a plaintiff could always put 
forth a policy argument stemming from the white primary cases—that a candidate who is one of 
the exclusive choices for public office and an essential part of the election machinery should be 
expected to comply with the Constitution that she hopes to one day defend. 
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campaigning for positions of power ought to demonstrate that they are 
prepared to comply with the constitutional constraints that will be 
imposed upon them if they win. In a world where the line between 
private and public is often blurry, and political actors seem to dance on 
that line, a new framework is necessary to think about when the actions 
of political candidates and their campaigns may be fairly attributable 
to the state. 
 
